Part II, Chapter 11: Observations for the purpose of discovering the Subject and the Attribute in certain Propositions expressed in an unusual manner
IT is doubtless a defect in common logic, that those who study it are accustomed to find out the nature of propositions or reasonings, only as they follow the order and arrangement according to which they are fashioned in the schools, which is often very different from that according to which they are fashioned in the world, and in books—whether of eloquence, or of morals, or of other sciences. Thus we have scarcely any other idea of subject and attribute, except that the one is the first term of a proposition, and the other the last;—and of universality and particularity, except that there is in the one omnis or nullus, (all or none,—and in the other, aliquis, some.
Nevertheless all this leads astray very often, and it is necessary to exercise judgment in order to discriminate these things in many propositions. We will commence with the subject and attribute.
The sole and the true rule is, to consider by the sense that of which we affirm, and that which we affirm; for the first is always the subject, and the last the attribute, in whatever order they may be found.
Thus there is nothing more common in Latin than such propositions as these:—Turpe est obsequi libidini,—It is disgraceful to be a slave of one’s passions;—in which it is plain from the sense, that turpe, disgraceful, is that which we affirm, and, consequently, the attribute; and obsequi libidini (to be the slave of one’s passions) that of which we affirm, i. e. what we declare to be disgraceful, and, consequently, the subject. So again, in St Paul, Est quaestus magnus pietas, cum sufficientia; the true order will be, Pietas cum sufficientia est quaestus magnus.
So also in these verses, —
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas; Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum Subjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari; Felix is the attribute, and the rest the subject.
The subject and the attribute are often still more difficult to discover in complex propositions; and we have already seen that we can sometimes only judge by the sequel of the discourse, and the intention of the author, which is the principal proposition, and which the incidental, in such propositions.
But, in addition to what we have already said, we may further remark, that in those complex propositions, in which the first part and the last are the principal, as in the major and the conclusion of the following reasoning:—God commands us to honour kings; Louis XIV. is king;
Therefore God commands us to honour Louis XIV. It is often necessary to change the active verb into the passive, in order to obtain the true subject of that principal proposition, as in this very example. For it is clear that, reasoning thus, my principal intention in the major is to affirm something, from which I may conclude that we ought to honour Louis XIV.; and thus what I say of the Divine command is, properly, only an incidental proposition, confirming this affirmation, Kings ought to be honoured—Reges sunt honorandi; whence it follows that kings is the subject of the major, and Louis XIV. the subject of the conclusion, although, at first sight, each appears to be only a part of the attribute.
The following, also, are propositions very common in our language:—It is foolish to listen to flatterers—It is hail which falls—It is a God who has redeemed us. Now the sense proves to us, that in order to arrange them in their natural order, placing the subject before the attribute, we must express them thus:—To listen to flatterers is folly—That which falls is hail—He who has redeemed us is God. And this is almost universal in all propositions which commence with it is, where there is afterwards found a which or that, that they have their attribute at the commencement, and their subject at the end. It is sufficient to have adverted to this now; and all these examples are but to show that we ought to judge by the sense, and not by the order of the words. This advice is very necessary, that we be not deceived by considering syllogisms as vicious which are in reality very good ones; since, for want of discriminating the subject and the attribute, we think they are contrary to the rules when they are exactly conformed to them.