Part II, Chapter 12: Of Confused Subjects which are equivalent to Two Subjects
IT is important, in order to understand better the nature of what is called subject in propositions, to add here a remark which has been made in more important works than this, but which, since it belongs to logic, may find a place here.
It is, that when two or more things which have some resemblance succeed each other in the same place, and, principally, when there does not appear any sensible difference between them, although men may distinguish them in speaking metaphysically, they nevertheless do not distinguish them in their ordinary speech; but, embracing them under a common idea, which does not exhibit the difference, and denotes only what they have in common, they speak of them as if they were the same thing.
Thus, though we change the air every moment, nevertheless we consider the air which surrounds us as being always the same; and we say that, from being cold, it has become warm, as if it were the same, whereas often that air which we feel cold is not the same as that which we find warm.
This water, we also say, in speaking of a river, was turbid two days ago, and, behold, now it is clear as crystal; while it is impossible it could be the same water. In idem flumen bis non descendimus, says Seneca, manet idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est.
We consider the bodies of animals, and speak of them, as being always the same, though we are assured, that at the end of a few years there remains no part of the matter which at first composed them; and not only do we speak of them as the same body, without reflecting what we say, but we do so also when we reflect expressly on the subject. For common language allows us to say, The body of this animal was composed ten years ago of certain parts of matter, and now it is composed of parts altogether different. There appears to be some contradiction in speaking thus; for if the parts were altogether different, then is it not the same body. It is true; but we speak of it, nevertheless, as of the same body. And what renders these propositions true is, that the same term is taken for different subjects in this different application.
Augustus said that he had found the city of Rome of brick, and had left it of marble, in the same way we say of a town, of a mansion, of a church, that it was destroyed at such a time, and rebuilt at such another time. What, then, is this Some, which was at one time of brick, and at another time of marble? What are these towns, these mansions, and churches, which are destroyed at one time, and rebuilt at another? Is the Some of brick the same as the Some of marble? No; but the mind, nevertheless, forms to itself a certain confused idea of Some, to which it attributes these two qualities—being of brick at one time, and of marble at another. And when it afterwards forms propositions about it, and when it says, for example, that Rome, which was brick before the time of Augustus, was marble when he died,—the word Rome, which appears to be only one subject, denotes, nevertheless, two, which are really distinct, but united under the confused idea of Rome, which prevents the mind from perceiving the distinction of these subjects.
It is by this means that the author of the book from which we borrowed this remark has cleared up the affected perplexity which the ministers delight to find in that proposition—this is my body—which no one would ever find, following the light of common sense. For, as we should never think of saying it was a proposition very perplexed, and very difficult to be understood, if we said of a church which had been burned and rebuilt—this church was burned ten years ago, and has been rebuilt in a twelve month—in the same way, we could not reasonably say there was any difficulty in understanding this proposition,—that which is bread at this moment is my body at this other moment. It is true that it is not the same this in these different moments, as the burned church and the rebuilt church are not really the same church; but the mind conceiving the bread and the body of Jesus Christ under the common idea of a present object, which it expresses by this, attributes to that object, which is really twofold, and only unity of confusion, the being bread at one moment, and the body of Jesus Christ at another, just as, having formed of that church burned and rebuilt, the common idea of a church, it gives to that confused idea two attributes, which cannot belong to the same subject.
Hence it follows that, taken in the sense of the Catholics, there is no difficulty in the proposition, this is my body, since it is only an abridgment of this other proposition, which is perfectly clear,—that which is bread at this moment is my body at this other moment—and since the mind supplies all that is not expressed. As we have remarked at the end of the First Part, when we used the demonstrative pronoun hoc to denote something which is presented to our senses, the precise idea formed by the pronoun remaining confused, the mind adds thereto the clear and distinct ideas obtained from the senses, in the form of an incidental proposition. Thus, when Jesus Christ pronounced the word this, the minds of the apostles added to it, which is bread, and as they conceived that it was bread at that moment, they made, also, the addition of time, and thus the word this formed also this idea,—this which is bread at this moment. In the same way, when Christ said that it was his body, they conceived that this was his body at that moment. Thus the expression, this is my body, formed in them that total proposition, this which is bread at this moment is my body at this other moment; and this expression being clear, the abridgment of the proposition, which diminishes nothing of the idea, is so also.
And as to the difficulty proposed by the ministers, that the same thing cannot be bread and the body of Jesus Christ, since it belongs equally to the extended proposition—this which is bread at this moment is my body at this other moment—and the abridged proposition—this is my body—it is clear that it is no better than a frivolous wrangling, which might be alleged equally against these propositions: this church was burned at such a time, and rebuilt at such another time; and that they must all be disintricated through this way of conceiving many separate subjects under a single idea, which occasions the same term to be sometimes taken for one term and sometimes for another, without any notice being taken by the mind of this transition from one subject to another.
After all, we do not here profess to decide the important question touching the way in which we ought to understand these words, whether in a figurative or in a literal sense; for it is not enough to show that a proposition may be taken in a certain sense, but it ought to be proved that it must be so taken. But as there are some ministers who, on the principles of a false logic, obstinately maintain that the words of Jesus Christ cannot bear a catholic sense, it is not out of place to show here, briefly, that the catholic sense has in it nothing but what is clear, reasonable, and conformed to the common language of all mankind.