Part II, Chapter 13: Other Observations for the purpose of finding out whether Propositions are Universal or Particular
WE may make some observations of the like kind, and equally important, touching the universality and particularity of propositions.
1st OBSERVATION.—We must distinguish between two kinds of universality, the one, which may be called metaphysical, the other moral.
We call universality, metaphysical, when it is perfect without exception, as, Every man is living, which admits of no exception.
And universality, moral, when it admits of some exception since in moral things it is sufficient that things are generally such, ut plurimum, as, that which St Paul quotes and approves of:
Cretenses semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres pigri. Or, what the same apostle says: Omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt, non quae Jesu Christi; Or, as Horace says:
Omnibus hoc vitium est cantoribus, inter amicos Ut nunquam inducant animum cantare rogati; Injussi nunquam desistant; Or, the common aphorisms:
That all women love to talk. That all young people are inconstant. That all old people praise past times. It is enough, in all such propositions, that the thing be commonly so, and we ought not to conclude anything strictly from them.
For, as these propositions are not so general as to admit of no exceptions, the conclusion may be false, as it could not be inferred of each Cretan in particular, that he was a liar and an evil beast, although the apostle approves generally of this verse of one of their poets—The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, great gluttons—because there might be some persons who had not the vices which were common to the others.
Thus the moderation which ought to be observed in these propositions, which are only morally universal, is, on the one hand, to draw particular conclusions only with great judgment, and, on the other, not to contradict them, or reject them as false, although instances may be adduced in which they do not hold, but, to satisfy ourselves, if we hear them carried too far, with showing that they ought not to be taken so strictly.
2d OBSERVATION.—There are some propositions which ought to be considered as metaphysical universals, though they may admit of exceptions, when in common custom it is not necessary for these extraordinary exceptions to be comprised in universal terms: as, if I say—all men have two arms—this proposition ought to be considered as true, in ordinary use. And it would be only wrangling to maintain that there had been monsters, who, although they had four arms, were nevertheless considered men; because it is sufficiently clear, in these general propositions, we do not speak of monsters, but we mean to say that, in the order of nature, men have but two arms.
We may say, also, in the same way, that all men employ sounds for the purpose of expressing their thoughts, but that all men do not employ writing; and it would not be a reasonable objection to this, that mutes may be found to falsify this proposition, since it is clear enough, without being expressed, that this ought to be understood only of those who have no natural impediment to the use of sounds, either because they cannot learn them, as is the case with those who are born deaf, or because they cannot form them, as is the case with the dumb.
3d OBSERVATION.—There are some propositions which are universal, only because they ought to be understood de generibus singulorum, and not de singulis generum, as the philosophers say; i. e., of all the species of each genus, and not of all the particulars of these species. Thus we say that all animals were saved in Noah’s ark, because some of every species were saved in it. Jesus Christ also said of the Pharisees, that they paid the tenth of all herbs, decimatis omne olus,—not that they paid a tenth of all the herbs in the world, but because there were no kinds of herbs whereof they did not pay a tenth. Thus, too, St Paul says, Sicut et ego omnibus per omnia placeo,—that is to say, that he accommodated himself to all sorts of persons—Jews, Gentiles, Christians,—although he did not seek to please his persecutors, who were so numerous. Thus we say, also, that a man has passed through all offices, that is, through every kind of office.
4th OBSERVATION.—There are some propositions which are universal only because the subject is to be taken as restricted by a part of the attribute. I say, by a part; for it would be ridiculous for it to be restrained by the whole attribute, as if it were maintained, for instance, that this proposition were true, All men are just, because it was to be understood in this sense—that all just men are just, which would be frivolous. But when the attribute is complex, and has two parts, as in this proposition, All men are just, through the grace of Jesus Christ; and it may be maintained, with reason, that the term just is understood in the subject, though it be not expressed, since it is sufficiently clear that it is intended to say only, that all men who are just, are so through the grace of Jesus Christ alone. And thus, this proposition is rigorously true, though it might appear false, if we consider only what is expressed in the subject,—there being so many men who are wicked, or evil-doers, and who, consequently, have not been justified through the grace of Jesus Christ. There are a very great number of propositions in Scripture which ought to be taken in this sense, and, among others, that one in which St Paul says, As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all are made alive. For it is certain that a multitude of heathens, who have died in their infidelity, have not been made alive in Jesus Christ,—that they have no part in that glorious life of which St Paul here speaks. Thus the meaning of the apostle is, that as all those who die, die through Adam, so all those who are made alive, are made alive through Jesus Christ.
There are also many propositions which are morally universal in this way only, as when we say, The French are good soldiers,—The Dutch are good sailors,—The Flemish are good painters,—The Italians are good comedians; we mean to say that the French who are soldiers, are commonly good soldiers, and so of the rest.
5th OBSERVATION.—We are not to suppose that there is no other mark of particularity than the words quidam, aliquis—some, and the like. For, on the contrary, it very seldom happens that we use them, especially in our language (French).
When the particle des or de is the plural of the article un, according to the new remark of the General Grammar, it causes the nouns to be taken particularly, whereas they are commonly taken generally, with the article les. Hence there is a great deal of difference between these two propositions, Les medecins croient maintenant qu’il est bon de boire pendant le chaud de la fievre,—Physicians believe now that it is well to drink during the heat of the fever; and, Des medecins croient maintenant que le sang ne se fait point dans le foie,—Some physicians believe now that the blood is not made in the liver. For les medecins, in the first, denotes the mass of physicians at the present day; and des medecins, in the second, denotes only some particular physicians.
But after or before de, or des, or un, in the singular, we place il y a (there is, or are), as, il y a des medecins; and this in two ways:
The first is, by simply placing after des or un the substantive to be the subject to the proposition, whether it be the first or the last: as, Il y a des douleurs salutaires; il y a des plaisirs funestes; il y a de faux amis; il y a une humilite genereuse; il y a des vices couverts de l’apparence de la vertu. In this way we express in our (French) language, that which is expressed by quelques in the style of the school: Quelques douleurs sont salutaires; quelque humilite est genereuse; and thus in the others.
The second way is that of joining the adjective to the substantive by a qui (who, or which): Il y a des craintes qui sont raisonnables—(There are some fears which are reasonable). But this qui does not prevent these propositions from being simple in sense, though complex in expression; for it is as if we said simply, Quelques craintes sont raisonnables. These following forms of speech are still more common than the preceding:—Il y a des hommes qui n’aiment qu’eux-mêmes; il y a des Chretiens qui sont indignes du nom—(There are men who love themselves alone; there are Christians who are unworthy of the name). We have the same expression sometimes used in Latin: Sunt quibus in satyra videor nimis acer, et ultra Legem tendere opus; Which is the same thing as if it were said,
Quidam existimant me nimis acrem esse in satyra,-—There are some who think me too pointed in satire. So also in the Scripture, Est qui nequiter se humiliat,—There are some who humble themselves wickedly.
Omnis, all, with a negation, makes a particular proposition, with this difference, that in Latin the negation precedes omnis, and in French it follows all (tout): Non omnis qui dicit mihi, Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum ccelorum,—Not all who say unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; Non omne peccatum est crimen,—Every sin is not a crime.
Nevertheless, in Hebrew, non omnis is often put for nullus, as in the psalm, Non justificabitur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens,—No man living shall be justified before God. This happens, because, in this case, the negation falls on the verb, and not on omnis.
6th OBSERVATION.—The foregoing observations are very useful when there is a term of universality, as all, none. &c; but when there is no such term, and none of particularity either, as when I say, Man is rational, man is just, it is a celebrated question among philosophers, whether these propositions, which they call indefinite, ought to be called universal or particular. This question must be understood of those which have no context, and which are not determined by what follows, to either of these senses; it cannot be doubted that we ought to determine the sense of a proposition, where it has any ambiguity, by what accompanies it in the discourse of which it forms a part.
Considering it in itself, then, philosophers say that they ought to be considered universal in necessary matter, and particular in contingent matter,
I find this maxim approved of by very able men. It is, nevertheless, very false; and it may be said, on the contrary, that when we attribute any quality to a common term, the indefinite proposition ought to be considered universal, whatever its matter may be. And thus, in contingent matters, it ought not to be considered as a particular proposition, but as a universal, which is false. And this is the natural judgment which all men form of such propositions, rejecting them as false when they are not true generally, at least when they have not moral generality, with which men rest satisfied in their common discourses about things in the world.
For who would allow it to be said, that bears are white; that men are black; that the Parisians are gentlemen; that Poles are Socinians; that Englishmen are Quakers? and yet, according to the distinction of these philosophers, these propositions ought to be considered quite true, since, being indefinite in contingent matter, they ought to be reckoned particular. Now it is very true that there are some bears white, as those of Nova Zembla; some men black, as the Ethiopians; some Parisians gentlemen; some Poles Socinians; some Englishmen Quakers. It is, therefore, clear, that in any matter whatever, indefinite propositions of this kind are taken universally; but in a contingent matter we are satisfied with moral universality. Whence we may very well say, The French are brave; the Italians suspicious; the Germans heavy; the Orientals voluptuous; although this may not be true of every individual, because we are satisfied that it is true of the majority.
There is, then, another distinction on this subject, which is much more reasonable, which is, that these indefinite propositions are universal in matters of doctrine: as, angels have no body—and they are only particular in matters of fact and of history, as when it is said in the Gospel—Milites plectentes coronam de spinis, imposuerunt capiti ejus. It is very clear that this ought to be understood only of some soldiers, and not of all soldiers; the reason of which is, that in the case of particular actions, especially when they are determined to a given time, they generally agree to belong to a common term, only because of some particulars, a distinct idea of which is in the mind of those who make these propositions, so that, considering them aright, these propositions are rather singular than particular, as we may judge from what has been said of terms complex in sense.—(1st Part, Cap. 8; II. Part, Cap. 6.)
7th OBSERVATION.—The names of body, of community, people, when taken collectively, as they commonly are, for the whole body, the whole community, the whole people, do not, properly, make the propositions into which they enter universal, still less particular, but rather singular, as when I say—the Romans conquered the Carthaginians—the Venetians carry on war against the Turks—the judges of such a place have condemned a criminal. These propositions are not universal, otherwise we might conclude of every Roman that he had conquered the Carthaginians, which would be false; neither are they particular, for this means more than if I were to say—some Romans conquered the Carthaginians;—but they are singular, inasmuch as we consider every nation as a moral person, whose existence is for several centuries,—who remains as long as he composes a state, and who acts through all these ages by those who compose it, as a man acts by his members. Whence it happens that we may say that the Romans, who were conquered by the Gauls who took Rome, conquered the Gauls in the time of Caesar, attributing thus to the same term, Romans, being conquered at one time, and victorious at another, though, at one of these times, there was not a single man who was also at the other. And this shows the foundation of the vanity which each individual has on account of the noble actions of his nation, in which he had no part, and which is as senseless as it would be for an ear which was deaf, to glory in the quickness of the eye, or in the skill of the hand.