Part III, Chapter 17: Places, or the Method of Finding Arguments
WHAT the rhetoricians and logicians call places, loci argumentorum, are certain general heads, to which may be reduced all the proofs which we employ in the various matters of which we treat; and the part of logic which is termed invention, is nothing else than that which teaches of these places Ramus quarrelled on this subject with Aristotle, and with the philosophers of the schools, because they treated of places after having given the rules of arguments, and he maintained against them that it was necessary to explain the places, and what pertains to invention, before treating of these rules.
The reason Ramus assigns for this is, that we must have the matter found, before we can think of arranging it.
Now the exposition of places teaches us to find this matter, whereas the rules of argument can only teach us to arrange it.
But this reason is very feeble, for although it be necessary for the matter to be found, in order to its arrangement, it is, nevertheless, not necessary that we should learn how to find the matter before having learnt how to dispose of it. For, in order to learn how to dispose of the matter, it is enough to have some general matter, as examples; but the mind and common sense always furnish enough of these, without its being needful to borrow them from any art or method. It is, therefore, true that it is necessary to have some matter, in order to apply the rules of argument: but it is not true that it is necessary to find that matter by the method of places.
We might say, on the contrary, that since we undertake to teach, in the places, the art of finding arguments and syllogisms, it is necessary to know beforehand, what is an argument, and what a syllogism. But it might, perhaps, be replied, in like manner, that nature alone furnishes us with a general knowledge of what reasoning is, which is sufficient to enable us to understand what is said of it in the places.
It is, therefore, of no service to trouble ourselves about the order in which places should be treated of, since it is a matter of very little consequence. But it may, perhaps, be more useful to inquire, whether it will not be more to the purpose not to treat of them at all.
We know that the ancients made a great mystery of this method, and that Cicero preferred it to all dialectic, as it was taught by the Stoics, since they did not speak of places at all. Let us leave, says he, all that science which tells us nothing about the art of finding arguments, and which is only too prolix in teaching us to judge of them. Istam artem totam relinquamus quae in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium est, in judicandis nimium loquax. Quintilian, and all the other rhetoricians,—Aristotle, and all the philosophers—speak of it in the same way, so that we could hardly differ from their opinion, if general experience did not appear entirely opposed to it.
We may adduce, as evidence of this, almost as many persons as have passed through the ordinary course of study, and who have learned, by this artificial method, to find out the proofs which are taught in the colleges. For is there any one of them who could say truly, that when he has been obliged to discuss any subject, he has reflected on these places, and has sought there the reasons which were necessary for his purpose? Consult all the advocates and preachers which are in the world, all who speak and write, and who always have matter enough, and I question if one could be found who had ever thought of making an argument a causa, ab effectu, ab adjunctis, in order to prove that which he wished to establish.
And although Quintilian seems to have held this art in much esteem, he is, nevertheless, obliged to confess that we need not, when we treat of any matter, go knocking at the door of all these places, in order to obtain arguments and proofs. " Illud quoque” says he, " studiosi eloquentiae cogitent non esse cum proposita fuerit materia dicendi scrutanda singula et velut ostiatim pulsanda, ut sciant an ad id probandum quod intendimus, forte respondeant.”
It is true that all the arguments which we make on any subject may be reduced to those heads, and to those general terms, which we call places; but it is not by this method that we prove them. Nature, the attentive consideration of the subject, the knowledge of different truths, enable us to furnish these, and then art connects these in certain ways, so that we may say truly of places what St Augustine said in general of the precepts of rhetoric. " We find,” says he, " that the rules of eloquence are observed in the speeches of eloquent persons, although they never think of these in making them, whether they know them, or are ignorant of them. They practise these rules because they are eloquent, but they do not adhere to them in order to be eloquent. Implent quippe illa quia sunt eloquentes, non adhibent ut sint eloquentes.
We walk naturally, as the same father observes in another place, and in walking we make certain regular movements of the body; but it would avail nothing for the purpose of teaching us to walk, to say, for instance, that we must send the spirits to certain nerves, move certain muscles, make certain movements in the joints, put one foot before the other, and lean on one while the other advances. We may form these rules very well by observing what nature causes us to do, but we could never make those actions by the help of these rules. Thus, we treat of all these places in the most ordinary discourse, and we can say nothing that is not connected with them; but it is not by making a formal reflection on them that we produce these thoughts, such reflection will only help to damp the ardour of the mind and to prevent our finding natural and striking reasons, which are the true ornaments of every kind of discourse.
Virgil, in the Ninth Book of the Æneid, after having represented Euryalus surprised and surrounded by his enemies, who were about to revenge on him the death of their companions, which Nisus, the friend of Euryalus, had slain, puts these words, full of passionate emotion, in the mouth of Nisus: —
Me, me adsum, qui feci; in me convertite ferrum, O Rutuli! mea fraus omnis: nihil iste nec ausus, Nec potuit. Coelum hoc, et sidera conscia tester. Tantum infelicem nimium dilexit amicum.
" This is an argument,” says Ramus, " a causa efficiente, but we may judge with certainty, that Virgil, when he wrote these verses, never dreamt of the place of efficient cause. He would never have made them had he stopped to search out that place; and it was necessary for him, in order to produce such noble and spirited verses, not only to forget these rules, if he knew them, but, in some sort, also to forget himself, in order to realise the passion which he portrayed.”
The little use which has been made of this method of places during the whole time that it has been discovered and taught in the schools, is a manifest proof that it is of no great service; but when we apply ourselves to obtain all the good which may be derived from it, we see that we cannot gain anything which is truly useful and valuable, for all that can be accomplished by this method, is to discover, on every subject, different thoughts, general, ordinary, remote, such as the Lullists find by means of their tables. Now, so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance, that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment, nothing which more chokes up good seed, than a crowd of noxious weeds; nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious fertility of common thoughts. The mind is accustomed to this facility, and no longer makes any effort to find appropriate, special, and natural reasons, which can only be discovered by an attentive consideration of the subject.
We ought to consider, then, that the abundance which is sought after by means of these places is an exceedingly small advantage; it is not wanted by a greater part of the world. We sin much more by excess than by defect, and our discourses are only too full of matter. Thus, in order to produce in men a wise and solid eloquence, it would be much more useful to teach them to be silent than to speak, that is to say, to repress and to cut off the low, common, and false thoughts, than to give them forth as they arise—a confused mass of reasonings, good and bad, with which books and discourses are filled.
And since the use of places hardly avails for anything, save for the finding of these kinds of thoughts, we may say, that if it is right to know what is said of them, since so many celebrated men have spoken of them that there has arisen a kind of necessity to know in general so common a thing, it is far more important to be thoroughly persuaded that there is nothing more ridiculous than to employ them, in talking about everything, to no purpose as the Lullists do by means of their general attributes, which are kinds of places; and that fatal facility of talking about everything, and of finding a reason for everything, of which some are vain, is so wretched a characteristic of mind, that it is far below stupidity.
Hence the whole advantage which can be derived from these places is reduced rather to the general effect which they produce; which may, perhaps, be of some service without our knowing it, in enabling us to recognise at once, in the subject of which we treat, more of its phases and parts.