Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 8. The definition of fortune
First, then, we observe that some things come to pass in the same way always, but others for the most part.
It is clearly of neither of these that fortune is said to be the cause, nor can the effect of fortune be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or those that do so for the most part.
But, as there is a third class of events besides these two—events that all say are by fortune—it is plain that there is such a thing as fortune and chance; for we know that things of this kind are due to fortune and that things due to fortune are of this kind.
But, second, some events are for the sake of something, others not.
Again, some of the former class are in accordance with deliberate intention, others not, but both are in the class of things that are for the sake of something.
Hence, it is clear that, even among the things that are outside the necessary and the normal, there are some in connection with which the phrase “for the sake of something” is applicable. (Events that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature.)
Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass accidentally, are said to be “by fortune.” For just as a thing is something either in virtue of itself or accidentally, so may it be a cause.
For instance, the house-building faculty is in virtue of itself the cause of a house, whereas the pale or the musical is the accidental cause. That which is the per se cause of the effect is determinate, but the accidental cause is indeterminable, for the possible accidents of an individual are innumerable.
To resume, then: when a thing of this kind comes to pass among events that are for the sake of something, it is said to be by chance or by fortune. (The distinction between the two must be made later—for the present, it is sufficient if it is plain that both are in the sphere of things done for the sake of something.)
For example, a man is engaged in collecting subscriptions for a feast. He would have gone to such and such a place for the purpose of getting the money, if he had known.
He actually went there for another purpose, and it was only accidentally that he got his money by going there; and this was not due to the fact that he went there as a rule or necessarily, nor is the end effected (getting the money) a cause present in himself—it belongs to the class of things that are intentional and the result of intelligent deliberation.
It is when these conditions are satisfied that the man is said to have gone by fortune.
If he had gone of deliberate purpose and for the sake of this—if he always or normally went there when he was collecting payments—he would not be said to have gone “by fortune.”
It is clear, then, that fortune is a per accidens cause in those things that come to be in a few instances according to what is proposed for the sake of an end. Thus, intelligent reflection and fortune are in the same sphere, for purpose implies intelligent reflection.
207. Having set forth the opinions of others about fortune and chance, the Philosopher here determines the truth.
This section is divided into three parts.
First, he shows what fortune is;
second, at “they differ” (197a36; [226]), he shows how fortune and chance differ;
third, at “both belong to” (198a2; [236]), he points out the genus of cause to which chance and fortune are reduced.
The first part is divided into two parts.
First, he shows what fortune is;
second, at “it is necessary” (197a8; [217]), he explains the meaning of those things that are said about fortune from the definition of fortune.
Concerning the first part, he makes three points.
First, he sets forth certain divisions needed for the investigation of the definition of fortune;
second, at “to resume, then” (196b29; [215]), he shows under which members of these divisions fortune is contained;
third, at “it is clear” (197a5; [216]), he finishes the definition of fortune.
Now, since fortune is posited as a kind of cause, and since it is necessary in order to understand a cause, to know that of which it is the cause, he first sets forth a division on the part of that of which fortune is the cause.
Second, at “things of this kind” (196b23; [214]), he sets forth a division on the part of the cause itself.
208. With reference to the first point, he sets forth three divisions.
The first of these (196b10) is that certain things always come to be, like the rising of the sun, while certain other things come to be frequently, such as a man born with eyes. But neither of these is said to be by fortune. But certain things besides these two occur in fewer instances, as when a man is born with six fingers or without eyes. And everyone says that things of this sort come to be by fortune. Hence, it is clear that fortune is something, for to be by fortune and to be in fewer instances are convertible. And he brings this up in opposition to the first opinion that denied fortune.
209. However, it seems that this division of the Philosopher is insufficient, for there are some happenings that are indeterminate. Therefore, Avicenna said that, in those things that are indeterminate, a thing happens to be by fortune, such as those things that happen less often.
And it is no objection that it is not said that Socrates sits by fortune, since this is indeterminate. For although this is indeterminate with respect to the moving potency, it is not indeterminate with respect to the appetitive potency, which tends determinately to one thing. And, if something should happen outside of the appetitive potency, it would be said to be fortuitous.
Now, just as the moving potency, which is indeterminate, does not move to act unless it is determined to one thing by the appetitive potency, so also nothing that is indeterminate moves to act unless it is determined to one thing by something. For that which is indeterminate is, as it were, being in potency.
However, potency is not a principle of action; only act is such. Hence, from that which is indeterminate, nothing follows unless it is determined to one thing by something, either always or frequently. And because of this, he omitted things that are indeterminate from his discussion of things that come to be.
210. It must also be noted that some define the necessary as that which is never impeded and the contingent as that which occurs frequently but may be impeded in a few instances.
But this is unreasonable. “Necessary” is said of what has in its nature that which cannot not be, but “contingent” of what happens frequently, which is able to not be. But to have or not have some impediment is itself contingent. For nature does not prepare an impediment for that which cannot not be, since this would be superfluous.
211. He gives the second division at “but, second” (196b17). He says that some things come to be for the sake of an end while other things do not. This division, however, raises a difficulty, because every agent acts for an end; it acts either by nature or by intellect.
But we must note that he is saying that those things that come to be for themselves do not come to be for the sake of something, insofar as they have in themselves a pleasure or perfection because of which they are pleasing in themselves. Or else he is speaking of those things that do not occur for the sake of a deliberate end—for example, stroking the beard or some other such thing that takes place at times without deliberation and solely from the motion of the imagination. Hence, they have an imagined end, but not a deliberated end.
212. He gives the third division at “again, some of the former” (196b18). He says that, of the things that come to be for the sake of an end, some happen in accordance with will and others do not.
Both of these are found among those things that come to be for the sake of something. For not only those things that come to be by will but also those things that come to be by nature come to be for the sake of something.
213. Now, since those things that come to be either necessarily or frequently come to be from nature or from that which is proposed, it is clear that, both in those things that always happen and in those things that happen frequently, there are some things that come to be for an end. For both nature and that which is proposed act for the sake of an end.
And thus it is clear that these three divisions include each other. For those things that come to be from what is proposed or from nature come to be for the sake of an end, and those things that come to be for the sake of an end come to be always or frequently.
214. Next, at “things of this kind” (196b23), he gives the division from the part of the cause. He says that, when things of this kind—that is, things that are from what is proposed for the sake of something and that are in few instances—come to be through a per accidens cause, we say that they are by fortune. For as certain aspects of beings are per se and others per accidens, the same is true of causes. Thus, the per se cause of a house is the builder’s art, while the per accidens cause is the white or the musical.
But it must be noted that a per accidens cause is taken in two ways:
in one way on the part of the cause, and in another way on the part of the effect.
On the part of the cause, that which is called a per accidens cause is joined to the per se cause. Thus, if the white and the musical are called causes of a house, it is because they are accidentally joined to the builder.
On the part of the effect, we sometimes refer to something that is accidentally joined to the effect, as when we say that a builder is the cause of strife because strife arises from the building of a house. In this sense, fortune is said to be a per accidens cause when something is accidentally joined to the effect—for example, if the discovery of a treasure is accidentally joined to the digging of a grave.
Thus, the per se effect of a natural cause is what follows according to the exigencies of its form such that the effect of the agent who acts through something proposed is that which happens because of the intention of the agent. Hence, whatever takes place in the effect outside this intention is per accidens.
And I say that this is true if what is outside the intention follows in few cases. For what is always or frequently joined to the effect falls under the intention itself. For it is stupid to say that someone intends something but does not will that which is always or frequently joined to it.
Moreover, he points out a difference between the per se cause and the per accidens cause. The per se cause is limited and determinate, whereas the per accidens cause is unlimited and indeterminate, because an infinity of things can happen to be united.
215. Next, at “to resume, then” (196b29), he points out those members of the above divisions under which fortune is contained and what fortune is. He says first that fortune and chance, as was said above, pertain to those things that happen for the sake of something. However, the difference between fortune and chance will be determined later. But now it should be clear that each of them is contained among those things that act for the sake of an end.
Thus, if one knows that he will receive money in the forum, and if he goes there to take it away, but if he did not go there for this purpose, it is per accidens that his arrival should have this effect, that he got his money. And thus it is clear that fortune is a per accidens cause of things that are for the sake of something.
Further, it is clear that fortune is a cause of things that occur in few instances. For carrying money away is said to be by fortune when he who takes money away comes to the house neither necessarily nor frequently.
Moreover, fortune pertains to those things that come to be because of what is proposed. For taking money away, which is said to be by fortune, is the end of some causes, but not in itself, as in those things that happen by nature.
Rather, it is the end of those things that come to be as proposed by the intellect. But, if someone acting under such a proposal should go in order to take money away, or if he always or frequently takes money away when he comes, this would not be said to be by fortune, just as, if anyone frequently or always soaks his feet when he goes to a muddy place, it would not be said that this is due to fortune, even though he did not intend it.
216. Next, at “it is clear” (197a5), he gives a definition of fortune that is drawn from what was said above. He says that it is clear from the foregoing that fortune is a per accidens cause in those things that come to be in a few instances according to what is proposed for the sake of an end. And from this it is clear that fortune and intellect pertain to the same thing. For only those who have an intellect act by fortune, for there is no proposal or will without intellect. And, although only those who have an intellect act by fortune, still the more something is subject to the intellect, the less is it subject to fortune.